The attorney-client privilege encourages communication between the attorney and client by precluding their discovery and use against the client. While the privilege suppresses relevant evidence, this loss is minimal for two reasons. First, the privilege is interpreted narrowly so that the least amount of evidence is lost. Second, if the theory of the privilege is accurate, it results in the suppression of evidence that otherwise would not have existed but for the existence of privilege protection.
 

Cause for Alarm
 

In a recent decision of the Texas Courts of Appeals, the court, in dicta, made a pronouncement regarding the scope of the attorney-client privilege protection, which if literally followed by other courts, threatens the balance between the clients' need for informed legal services and the people's need to have all relevant evidence available for the resolution of disputes. In its decision in In re Columbia Valley Regional Medical Center, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 1668 (13^th Dist., Mar. 8, 2001), the court made the curious observation that it "does not have the authority to shield portions of documents from discovery through the redaction of information covered by the attorney-client privilege, while allowing production of the remainder of the document." Id. at 10. While it was addressing this issue in the context of the physician-patient privilege, it was relying on attorney-client privilege case law. Citing a 1993 decision in Pittsburgh Corning Corp. v. Caldwell, 861 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Tex. App. 14^th Dist. 1993), the court further noted "once it is established that a document contains a confidential communication, the privilege extends to the entire document, and not merely to the specific portions related to legal advice, opinions or mental analysis." If Columbia Valley means literally what the court said, it appears to be a misinterpretation of Pittsburgh Corning -- reflecting a misunderstanding of the attorney-client privilege that is not uncommon throughout the country.
 

A Fundamental Principle
 

A fundamental limitation on the attorney-client is that it protects "communications," not "information." In other words, the information or facts included within an attorney-client communication remain irrelevant to the privileged status of that communication. Two implications extend from this principle.
 

First, the nature of the facts or information communicated to the attorney need not be confidential or otherwise privileged for the communication incorporating those facts to be confidential and privileged. When nonprivileged business or public information is confidentially communicated to the attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal advice or assistance, that communication is privileged. The communications cannot be discovered even though it contains facts relevant to the litigation.
 

Second, after the business or public information is communicated to the attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, the fact that the information was communicated in that way and for that purpose does not make the information privileged. Nonprivileged information may still be discovered from the client through any permissible discovery mechanism other than asking the client "what did you say to your attorney."
 

This distinction was clearly understood in Pittsburgh Corning and the another decisions relied upon by the court. See Keene Corporation v. Caldwell, 840 S.W.2d 715, 720 (Tex. App. 14^th Dist. 1992). In Keene, the court noted "[i]f a document is privileged or exempted from discovery under the rules, the fact that certain information within the documents may be discoverable through other means does not overcome the privilege." Similarly, in Pittsburgh Corning the court reasoned "[i]f we were to hold that all or part of a document containing privileged information should be disclosed because it also included facts pertinent to the lawsuit, the purpose of the attorney-client and work product privileges would be annihilated."
 

Clients can communicate to their attorneys anything they reasonably believe is needed to obtain the legal assistance desired, and the communications will be protected. Relevant facts, however, cannot be immunized from disclosure by the simple expedient of communicating them to an attorney. The Columbia Valley decision, however, could be interpreted as having gone a step beyond these principles when it held "the trial court does not have the authority to shield portions of documents from discovery through the redaction of information covered by the attorney-client privilege."
 

If the court in Columbia Valley meant only that responsive communications of an attorney are privileged to the extent they reveal the content of any prior communication from the client to the attorney, its decision would be consistent with the law of Texas and the rest of the country. If, however, the court meant to hold, that whenever a communication is found to be privileged, the entire communication is protected from disclosure, regardless of the purpose of the remainder of the communication, this result would not only be inconsistent with Texas precedent, it would radically expand the scope of the privilege and encourage nefarious practices.
 

In the corporate world, legal counsel is often a permanent full-time employee. In many of these corporations, in-house counsel has both business and legal responsibilities. Therefore, many communications with in-house legal counsel have both business and legal purposes. To make an entire communication privilege simply because a portion of it related to legal services would unfairly suppress relevant information. Even in those businesses in which in-house counsel has only legal responsibilities, making an entire communications privileged simply because a portion of it relates to legal matters encourages the practice of "funneling"-- the ploy of communicating business matters to the attorney on the pretext of obtaining legal advice, with copies being distributed to corporate executives who need to be apprized of that legal advise. This "legal" communication informs those executives of business matters that otherwise would be communicated to them in the normal course of business and, therefore, discoverable in future litigation. "Funneling" serves to immunize what otherwise would not be protected by a privilege.
 

This practice is very common and often quite difficult to detect. A literal interpretation of Columbia Valley would facilitate this ruse. When coupled with a reticence of judges to engage in in camera inspection of allegedly privileged documents, the success of such a practice is further enhanced. This rouse cannot be what Columbia Valley intended to signal. If a partially privileged communications is segregregable, courts not only have the power, they have the obligation as independent finders of fact to examine the communications in camera and require the production of nonprivileged portions after the privilege portions have been excised.
 

Therefore, the Columbia Valley dicta should be interpreted as reaffirming the lessons in Pittsburgh Corning -- attorney-client privilege protects "communications," not "information." Regardless of whether the facts incorporated into the communications with the attorney are otherwise relevant and discoverable, they cannot be obtained thorough the communication with the attorney. Rather, they must be acquired through other discovery mechanisms.